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Abstract
Adding to the emerging body of research related to the current coronavirus crisis, this paper
studies the impact of disease epidemics on the worldwide prevalence of the shadow or the
underground economy. The informal sector undermines compliance with government regulations
and lowers tax collections. Our main hypothesis is that epidemics positively impacts the spread
of the shadow economy. Using data on nearly 130 nations and nesting the empirical analysis in
the broader literature on the drivers of the shadow sector, we find that both the incidence and the
intensity of epidemics positively and significantly contribute to the spread of the underground
sector. Numerically, a ten percent increase in the intensity of epidemics leads to an increase in the
prevalence of the shadow economy by about 2.1 percent. These findings about the spillovers from
epidemics have implications for economic policies in the current times of coronavirus.
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Keywords: shadow economy, epidemics, COVID-19, government, economic development.

Aziz N. Berdiev
Bryant University / Smithfield / RI / USA
aberdiev@bryant.edu

Rajeev K. Goel*
Illinois State University / Normal / IL / USA
rkgoel@ilstu.edu

James W. Saunoris
Eastern Michigan University / Ypsilanti / MI / USA
jsaunori@emich.edu
*corresponding author

2
1. Introduction
Economics research on the impacts of disease epidemics has existed for some time (Adda
(2016), Becker (1990), Prior and Stanhope (1980)).1 These issues have again come to a head
with the recent and ongoing events related to the COVID-19 virus. Whereas various disciplines
are grappling with the unexpected scale and scope of the challenges unleashed by the
coronavirus, there are some longer-term and less immediate consequences that are not on the
front burners of researchers’ and policymakers’ concerns. Yet, some of these impacts could
persist over time and have adverse spillovers on other activities, making it important that
attention is devoted to the understanding of their influence early on.
This paper focuses on one such possible impact of epidemics – the worldwide prevalence of
the shadow economy.2 The shadow economy (also called the informal, underground or black
market) persists in all nations of the world, with variations in its scope (Medina and Schneider
(2017); Schneider and Enste (2013); Schneider et al. (2010)), as individuals and firms try to
evade regulations and taxes. The presence of the informal sector is challenging for governments
both because it undermines tax collections on the one hand, and adherence to regulations and
laws, on the other hand. Examples of shadow activities abound including under-reported income
by businesses, repairs by unlicensed contractors, smuggling of contraband, etc. Given its
importance and wide prevalence, a substantial body of work has emerged on the causes or
drivers of the underground sector (see Gërxhani (2004), Goel and Nelson (2016), and Schneider
and Enste (2000) for literature surveys). Within this spectrum of possible determinants of the

The World Health Organization defines an epidemic as: “The occurrence in a community or region of cases of an
illness, specific health-related behavior, or other health-related events clearly in excess of normal expectancy”
(https://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/).
2
The shadow economy captures economic activity that is unregistered in the official economy (see Schneider et al.
(2010) for details).
1
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shadow economy, the influence of disease epidemics has not been considered and forms the
focus of this work.
Specifically, we use worldwide data to see how disease epidemics impact the shadow
economy, considering both the incidence and intensity of epidemics. About fourteen percent of
the nearly 130 nations in our sample, faced a biological epidemic from 1991-2015
(www.cred.be; Table 1 and 1A). While the underlying source of the disaster data has broad
information on natural and technological (manmade) disasters (The Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED (www.cred.be)), we chose to focus on biological epidemics
because such disasters have direct relevance to the current COVID-19 crisis.3 Another advantage
of obtaining the data from a single source is that the disasters are consistently coded (and not
prone to media focus on only large disasters).
Adding to the emerging body of research related to the current coronavirus crisis (Baldwin
and Weder di Mauro (2020)), this paper studies the impact of disease epidemics on the
worldwide prevalence of the underground economy. Due to the breakdown of efficient
institutions and a sudden loss of employment, individuals and firms are likely to find the move to
the underground sector attractive. The breakdown of institutions or a shift in government’s focus
away from enforcement to finding a cure for the epidemic, lower the potential costs of
underground operations, while the unemployed find easier entry into the informal sector. This is
especially true when epidemics temporarily close some of the training centers for the
unemployed to retrain and reenter the formal labor force.

Specifically, CRED defines biological disasters as, “A hazard caused by the exposure to living organisms and their
toxic substances (e.g. venom, mold) or vector-borne diseases that they may carry. Examples are venomous wildlife
and insects, poisonous plants, and mosquitoes carrying disease-causing agents such as parasites, bacteria, or viruses
(e.g. malaria)”, https://www.emdat.be/classification.
3
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If it turns out that epidemics end up increasing the shadow sector, there would be a
consequent downward impact on governments’ efforts to contain epidemics both via a resource
constraint (low tax collections) and a lessened ability to monitor compliance with health and
safety regulations. Moreover, to the extent that individuals are evading stay-at-home orders and
participating in the shadow economy, this may undermine efforts to contain the spread of the
disease.
Key questions addressed in this research are:
•

Does the prevalence of disease epidemics significantly impact the prevalence of the
shadow economy?

•

Are the impacts of the incidence and the intensity (diffusion) of epidemics on the shadow
economy similar?

Besides answering the above questions using time series data for over 125 nations, the
analysis will draw recommendations for related policies in the times of coronavirus
(https://www.weforum.org/agenda/archive/covid-19). Placing the formal empirical analysis
within the significant cross-national determinants of the shadow economy, our results show that
both the incidence and the intensity of epidemics increase the shadow economy. These findings
withstand a series of robustness checks.
The structure of the rest of this paper includes the literature review and hypothesis in the next
section, followed by the empirical model, data, results, and conclusions.

2. Theoretical discussion and hypothesis
In this paper, we are interested in understanding the shadow economy’s response to
biological disasters classified as epidemics. The onset and spread of epidemics are largely
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uncertain so broadly speaking, one could view the analysis in the context of a shock to the
economy, with both macro and micro implications. In the context of the shadow economy –
epidemics relation, one could view the macro impacts being on institutions and government
resources, whereas the micro impacts would be individuals’ health and employment. All of these
potentially impact propensities to operate in the underground sector.
In particular, there are numerous channels through which one could envision how epidemics
could impact the underground sector (https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-05-coronavirusresponse-isnt-billion-people.html). One, epidemics impact the smooth functioning of government
institutions – both devoted to enforcement of rules and awarding of punishments. This
emboldens potential lawbreakers, with their potential net benefits from breaking the law
increasing (see Becker (1968)). Two, government efforts to contain the spread of viruses create
regional “islands” that are somewhat autonomous, again presenting opportunities for some to
evade paying taxes or adhering to regulations. These pockets or islands are not necessarily
created by geographic distances but might be the result of governments favoring certain areas of
high virus prevalence (e.g., capital cities). Breakdowns in communications networks following
epidemics might also result in such isolated areas. The presence of such pockets might engender
barter transactions, which cannot be traced by tax officials. Third, in times of crises posed by
epidemics, market functions are disrupted, providing opportunities for entry to unauthorized or
shadow agents. Anecdotal evidence exists under the current COVID-19 crisis with instances of
unauthorized (home) barber shops, in-home informal tuitions, unauthorized ambulance or taxi
services, etc.
Furthermore, the counter-cyclical relationship between shadow economies and formal sector
business cycles, as shown by Elgin (2013), is likely to exist as epidemics depress the formal
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sector. Shadow economies serve as an economic buffer to absorb the over- or under- capacity of
the formal sector. During economic recessions, the shadow economy offers an attractive
alternative for earning income among unemployed individuals, especially to prevent losing
unemployment insurance benefits. In other words, unemployed individuals might prefer to work
in the shadow sector in order to earn additional income that is concealed from the government.
Whereas Raddatz (2007) provides evidence that epidemics lower formal economic activity, we
argue that epidemics might drive individuals to the shadow economy. It is perhaps expected that
the underground economy provides refuge for individuals who lose formal sector employment
(see, e.g., Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008); Bajada and Schneider (2009)).
One could also argue that the demand for goods and services in the shadow economy might
rise during epidemics as economic participants are more likely to purchases goods and services
in the shadow economy since they are, on average, less costly than formal sector goods and
services and of similar quality (Schneider and Enste (2013)). Additionally, the shutdown
implemented by governments following epidemics might make certain formal sector goods and
services unattainable, thereby inducing shadow participants to step in to meet these demands.
Another reason might be that firms may partially or fully transition to the underground sector
in order to save resources and or cut costs. Indeed, during the current COVID-19 pandemic,
small businesses are deciding to defy government orders to remain closed, and instead are
continuing to serve their customers.4 Furthermore, increased demand combined with anti-price
gouging laws that result in shortages of necessary goods and services during epidemics (e.g.,
face masks, disinfectants, etc.) offer unique opportunities for budding shadow entrepreneurs. All

4

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-18/rogue-businesses-go-underground-as-covid-black-markettakes-off.
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of these reasons suggest that the incidence and spread of epidemics might drive individuals and
businesses to the shadow economy.
In addition to the tie to the shadow economy literature, this work also adds to the economics
of epidemics (Adda (2016), Kahn (2005), Ma et al. (2020), Rasul (2020)), or more broadly, to
the effects of macroeconomic shocks (Nov (2009)). This body of work, with a renewed focus on
COVID-19 in recent months (see Baldwin and Weder di Mauro (2020), Jordá et al. (2020)), has
in the past mostly focused on the impacts of specific epidemics and/or specific regions (Armien
et al. (2008), Bloom and Mahal (1997), Folgi and Veldkamp (2019), Hasala et al. (2012), Prior
and Stanhope (1980)). The broad consideration of various epidemics over time in regard to their
impact on the underground economy is unique to this work.
Based on the above discussion, we frame our main hypothesis that we test using annual data
from a large set of nations:
H1: Greater prevalence of disease epidemics would increase the shadow or the underground
sector.
To test hypothesis H1, we consider the impact of both the incidence and severity of
epidemics on the shadow economy. Given the current COVID-19 crisis, and the worldwide
development of the shadow economy, understanding the spillovers from epidemics on
underground economic activity could have important implication for current economic policies.
We turn next to the empirical model and data.

3. Empirical model and data
3.1. Empirical model
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To test the above hypothesis and to focus on the key influence of epidemics, the general
model to explain the size of the shadow economy for country i and time t is:
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤it = f (𝐸𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐itm , 𝐸𝐶𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎit , 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚itg , 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑘 )

(1)

where
i = 1,…,129
t = 1991,…,2015
m = EpidemINC, EpidemDIFF
g = PolFreedom, EconFreedom
k = BureauQual, GovtSize
The dependent variable is the size of the shadow economy as a percent of GDP (Shadow).
This variable is estimated by Medina and Schneider (2017) for 158 nations from 1991 to 2015.
In this paper, we posit that the occurrence of epidemics in countries related to infectious diseases
(i.e., bacterial, viral, fungal, and prion) has an important influence on the decision for individuals
and firms to move underground. To account for this unique aspect, we include two variables that
capture the incidence of the epidemics (EpidemINC) and also the diffusion of epidemics
(EpidemDIFF). In other words, we account for both the occurrence and the severity, or intensity,
of the epidemic on its impact on the shadow economy.
The baseline models, which alternatively include EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF, are
estimated using OLS and including regional fixed effects to account for region-specific
characteristics that influence the shadow economy.
In order to isolate the impact of epidemics on the shadow economy, we borrow from the
extant literature and control for a variety of other factors that influence the size of the shadow
economy (Gërxhani (2004); Goel and Nelson (2016); Schneider and Enste (2000)). In particular,
we account for formal economic growth (ECgrowth) to account for the health of the formal
Berdiev et al.
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sector economy, the degree of freedom measured as political (PolFreedom) and economic
(EconFreedom), and the quantity, or size, of government (GovtSize) and the quality of
government (BureauQual). Strong economic growth in the formal sector raises the opportunity
cost of producing underground. Greater political freedom gives the power of voice in
encouraging elected officials to behave in a favorable way and reduce the need to exit to the
underground sector. Likewise, more economic freedom (e.g. low taxes and regulations) in the
formal sector diminishes the relative benefits of the underground economy relative to the formal
economy (Berdiev et al. (2018)). The strength and quality of institutions, proxied by bureaucratic
quality, improve the workings of the formal sector and thus reduce the impetus for underground
activities (Dreher et al. (2009); Torgler and Schneider (2009); Berdiev et al. (2020)). Lastly, the
size of government can have various impacts including promoting the development of the
shadow economy if the long arm of the government encourages people to move underground, or
decreasing the size of the shadow economy if the government uses its resources to combat
shadow activities (Goel and Nelson (2016)).

3.2. Data
The data set is a panel of 129 countries observed annually from 1991 to 2015 – see Table 1A
for a list of countries used in the analysis. The data is constrained by the dependent variable
capturing the size of the shadow economy from Medina and Schneider (2017) that is available
only from 1991 to 2015. Still, the period of the analysis is instructive for framing policies in
times of the current coronavirus crisis.
The clandestine nature of the underground economy necessitates creative ways to uncover
their activities (see Schneider and Buehn (2013) for a review). One technique used to measure
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the size of the shadow economy that has gained popularity is the multiple indicators, multiple
causes (MIMIC) method (Schneider et al. (2010)). The MIMIC method uses covariance
information from several observable causal and indicator variables to estimate the latent shadow
economy. Specifically, the MIMIC method is a structural equations model that is comprised of
two equations, the structural model that links the causal variables to the shadow economy, and
the measurement model that links the shadow economy to the indicator variables. Our measure
of the shadow economy comes from Medina and Schneider (2017) who use the MIMIC method
to provide the most recent estimates of the shadow economy for a large panel of nations. This
estimate of the shadow economy is an improvement on the widely used measure of the shadow
economy from Schneider et al. (2010). According to this estimate of the shadow economy, the
average size of the shadow economy is approximately 32% of GDP with considerable variation
across countries, with a high of 72% (Georgia) and a low of 8% (Switzerland).
Data on epidemics related to biological disasters is from the Emergency Events Database
(EM-DAT) from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED,
www.cred.be). This database, which has been utilized extensively by prior studies (see, e.g.,
Kahn (2005), Raddatz (2007) and Noy (2009)), includes epidemics related to infectious diseases
including viral, bacterial, fungal, and prion from 1900 to 2020 for 160 countries. According to
this data set, approximately 57% of epidemics are bacterial disease, 40% are viral disease, and
3% are parasitic disease. Among the most common epidemics were caused by Cholera, Dengue,
and Meningococcal disease. Based on the start and end date of each epidemic identified in this
database for each country, we create a dummy variable (EpidemINC) that is equal to one for the
years the epidemic occurred and zero otherwise. To capture the severity of the epidemic, we also
consider the number of people affected (EpidemDIFF), which includes 100 or more people that
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are affected, injured or homeless as a result of the epidemic.5 Due to the number of zeros in the
number affected, we transform this variable by adding one to all observations and then dividing
this by population (in millions) and then take the natural log.6 The Democrat Republic of the
Congo and Niger experienced the highest incidence of epidemics over the 1991-2015 time period
and Niger also had the most affected cases. Also, the correlation between Shadow and
EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF is approximately 0.24.
The other variables used in the analysis are from reputed international sources that are
routinely used in the literature. Complete details about variable definitions, summary statistics
and data sources are provided in Table 1.

4.

Results

4.1.

Baseline results
We test the impact of EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF on the shadow economy and present the

baseline regression estimates in Models 2.1 and 2.2 of Table 2, respectively. This enables us to
verify the validity of hypothesis H1.
The results show that the coefficient on EpidemINC is positive and statistically significant at
the 5% level, thereby suggesting that the presence of epidemics increase the size of the shadow
economy. Epidemics prompt individuals and firms to move underground as a means to maintain
operations and earn income. Furthermore, during epidemics, the focus of nations likely shifts
away from controlling the shadow economy, which lowers the expected costs of operating

5

The number of deaths caused by the epidemic is another potential measure of the severity; however, a deadlier
disease is one that has less time to spread. Therefore, we prefer to use the number affected to capture severity and
likely has a more direct impact on the spread of the shadow economy.
6
Similar transformations have been used by the extant literature (see, e.g., Kahn (2005) and Healy and Malhotra
(2010)).
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underground. Numerically speaking, the occurrence of an epidemic increases the size of the
shadow economy by 1.32 percentage points. This finding thus confirms our hypothesis H1 that
epidemics are positively linked with shadow development.
Next, we turn to assess the severity of epidemics on underground participation. This
consideration enables us to account for nations that are dissimilarly impacted by epidemics. The
coefficient on EpidemDIFF is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. These
findings imply that nations that have more individuals affected by epidemics experience a larger
underground sector. Besides the reasons mentioned above, with a large diffusion of the disease,
networking and demonstration might play a role in inducing movement underground.
Furthermore, the onset of epidemics might induce migration by some of the people in affected
areas, and this might contribute to the underground sector (Goel et al. (2020)). In terms of
magnitude, the underground economy increases by about 2.1 percent with a 10 percent increase
in the number of individuals affected (per million population). These results continue to highlight
that the occurrence of an epidemic and the severity (or intensity) of the epidemic promote
shadow sector activities.
Turning to the control variables, the coefficients on ECgrowth, BureauQual, and
EconFreedom are negative, whereas the coefficient on PolFreedom is positive, all at the 1%
level of significance. As expected, prosperous countries have strengthened enforcement and
higher opportunity costs of operating underground. Furthermore, the quality of government
bureaucracy, and institutions that support policies to promote economic freedom curb
underground participation. Greater political freedom or a higher degree of democracy is tied to a
due legal process, which is often lengthy. This delay lowers the expected value of punishment
for operating underground.
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The coefficient on GovtSize is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This
suggests that nations with larger governments have a lower incidence of shadow activity. This is
consistent with the notion that a larger government also has some resources devoted to
enforcement, which lowers the prevalence of the shadow economy. Overall, the results for the
control variables are broadly consistent with the literature (e.g., Dreher et al. (2009); Goel and
Nelson (2016); Berdiev et al. (2018)).
To tests the validity of our results, we conduct several robustness checks to account for the
following: the potential impact of outliers, the possible simultaneity between epidemics and the
shadow economy, additional control variables, and the potential simultaneity between economic
growth and the shadow economy. Furthermore, we also address potential heterogeneity by
splitting the sample into non-island, non-OECD and OECD nations. The regression estimates for
the robustness checks are reported in Models 2.3-2.8 of Table 2, Tables 3 and 4.

4.2. Considering additional control variables
As our first robustness check, we account for additional control variables, namely, the
strength of the rule of law (RuleLaw), the unemployment rate (UNEMP) and the level of
education (EDUC). A consistent rule of law increases the potential punishments for breaking the
law and we would expect nations with a strengthened rule of law to have a smaller shadow
economy, ceteris paribus (e.g., Torgler and Schneider (2009); Dreher et al. (2009)). Greater
educational attainment promotes understanding and adherence to the laws, while making entry
into the formal labor force easier (e.g., Loayza et al. (2009); Berdiev and Saunoris (2018)). Both
of these factors would check the informal sectors. Finally, the unemployed have a higher

Berdiev et al.

14
propensity to enter the informal sector (e.g., Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008); Bajada and
Schneider (2009)).
We add these additional control variables one at a time to our baseline models and report the
results in Table 2, Models 2.3-2.8. First of all, the positive impact of epidemics on the shadow
economy that was shown in the baseline models, remains and is statistically significant for both
EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF in all models. Thus, both the incidence and the intensity of
epidemics contribute to the spread of shadow operations, and these results withstand the
inclusion of additional covariates.7
Furthermore, the results for unemployment and education are consistent with intuition (albeit
fail to gain statistical traction at conventional levels of significance) – greater educational
attainment reduces the size of the shadow economy (Models 2.7-2.8), while greater
unemployment has the opposite effect (Models 2.5-2.6). The result for the rule of law, showing
the expected negative and statistically significant effect, implies that countries with a
strengthened rule of law curb underground participation (Models 2.3-2.4). The results with
respect to the other controls closely support the baseline models (Models 2.1-2.2).

4.3. Accounting for the potential impact of outliers
It is possible that some nations might have abnormally high/low rates of epidemic diffusion
or of the shadow economy. These large variations in the spread of epidemics are also evident in
the current case of COVID-19 (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html). Accordingly, as a
robustness check, we account for the possible influence of outliers employing robust regressions.

7

We also checked the robustness of these findings by considering additional covariates including a measure of
regulatory quality, population density, and exports as a percentage of GDP. These results, not reported here but
available upon request, continue to support our baseline models.
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In particular, robust regression corrects for outliers by utilizing Cook’s distance less than one and
conducts Huber iterations and then biweight iterations (see Li (1985)).
We re-estimate the baseline equations using robust regression and present the results in
Models 3.1-3.2 of Table 3. The results continue to show that the coefficients on EpidemINC and
EpidemDIFF are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, thus supporting the
baseline findings that the presence and intensity of epidemics are positively associated with the
shadow economy. The results for the control variables are in line with our earlier findings.

4.4. Accounting for the potential simultaneity between epidemics and the shadow economy
It is possible that there are reverse feedbacks from the shadow economy to epidemics – for
instance, nations with a large shadow economy (since the informal sector operators do not follow
health and safety regulations and are not monitored), might have a larger incidence and diffusion
of epidemics.
To mitigate concerns with endogeneity, we, therefore, employ the lagged values of
EpidemINC and EpidemDIFF and re-estimate the baseline specifications. The results, displayed
in Models 3.3 and 3.4 of Table 3, show that the coefficients on lagged values of EpidemINC and
EpidemDIFF are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, thereby confirming
our baseline results. This also suggests that the impact of epidemics on the shadow economy
persists over time, which is in line with the reasoning of Jordá et al. (2020). The results for the
remainder of the variables are consistent with our baseline findings.

4.5. Accounting for the potential simultaneity between growth and the shadow economy
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Economic growth is an overarching measure with potentially numerous linkages. Thus, a
useful test of the validity of our findings should address the possible simultaneity between
economic growth and the shadow economy that might bias our results. A large shadow economy
might promote growth and development by, for example, providing complementary goods and
services (e.g. sub-contracting) or it might deter growth by undermining the government’s ability
to collect tax revenues that are used to finance growth-supporting public goods (see Schneider
and Enste (2000) and Goel et al. (2019) for a discussion). Furthermore, most of the other control
variables could have a relation with economic growth.
To alleviate issues with reverse causality between economic growth and the shadow
economy, we re-estimate the baseline models without the control variable ECgrowth and present
the corresponding results in Models 3.5 and 3.6 of Table 3.8 The coefficients on EpidemINC and
EpidemDIFF remain positive and statistically significant, thereby instilling confidence in our
baseline findings – again, as hypothesized, epidemics feed the informal sector. As before, the
control variables show similar influences on the shadow economy.

4.6. Accounting for country-specific characteristics
As our next robustness check, we account for unique country-specific characteristics that
may impact the relationship between epidemics and the shadow economy. For example, cultural
differences that are mostly fixed over our time of study likely influence the spread of epidemics
and the size of the shadow economy. To check the robustness of our main results to countryspecific heterogeneity, we re-estimate the baseline models controlling for country-fixed effects.

8

As an additional robustness check, we also considered the lagged value of ECgrowth in the baseline models. Reestimating the baseline models with the lagged value of ECgrowth confirmed our main findings – these results are
available upon request.
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These results are reported as Models 3.7 and 3.8 in Table 3. The coefficients on EpidemINC
and EpidemDIFF retain their sign and significance, albeit slightly smaller in magnitude relative
to the baseline models. Furthermore, the control variables maintain their sign and significance
with the important exception that government size is no longer statistically significant. Thus,
while the variable government size is no longer significant when country-specific characteristics
are accounted for, our main hypothesis is still supported.

4.7. Accounting for heterogeneous effects related to income and geography
In spite of the different controls that we employ to capture cross-country variations, it is
possible that some of the structural and institutional differences cannot be readily quantified. As
a result, we consider different samples of nations to shed additional light on the results – see
Table 1A for each sub-sample of countries. To this end, we split the sample of countries into
non-OECD and OECD countries. Additionally, we account for the unique geography of nonisland relative to island nations. Island nations have natural barriers against the spread of
epidemics from other nations, and they are also somewhat insulated from shadow economy
spillovers from neighboring nations (Goel and Saunoris (2014); Berdiev and Saunoris (2020)).
On the other hand, the OECD group of nations is quite prosperous and has strengthened
institutions which might help fight epidemics and control the shadow economy as well. In our
overall sample of 129 nations, there were 109 non-island nations and 31 OECD nations.
The results, replicating the baseline models from Table 2, are presented in Table 4. We find
that the emergence and severity of an epidemic is positively associated with the size of the
shadow economy in non-island (Models 4.1 and 4.2). This suggests that non-island nations are
similar to the overall sample – there remains the positive influence of epidemics on the
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prevalence of the shadow economy, and this is true both for the incidence and the diffusion of
epidemics. On the other hand, non-island nations, Models 4.3-4.4, did not see any appreciable
impact on the shadow economy from epidemics. This could be because there is relatively better
monitoring of informal activities, fewer informal sector opportunities, or a lack of spillovers
from immediate neighbors in such nations.
The impacts of epidemics are again similar for the non-OECD group (Models 4.5 and 4.6).
However, we find interesting differences for the OECD nations – both the incidence and
intensity of epidemics have no appreciable impact on the shadow economy in OECD nations
(Models 4.7 and 4.8). This is likely due to strengthened institutions and greater opportunity costs
of operating in the illegal shadow sector in these nations. Further, the wealthier nations are able
to provide relatively more generous fiscal support to the general public in times of
epidemics/crisis. Therefore, while in the current COVID-19 crisis, the wealthier nations seem to
be no less impacted than other nations in terms of the health impacts, they may be somewhat
better insulated in terms of the spillovers on the shadow or the underground sector.
Overall, in terms of spillovers on the shadow economy from epidemics, the OECD nations
and island nations are similar, while the group of non-OECD nations is similar to the non-island
group. This has some implications for cross-national policy coordination.
The results from the robustness checks largely confirm the validity of our baseline findings
that the occurrence of epidemics and the severity of epidemics drive entrepreneurs underground.
The concluding section follows.

5. Conclusions
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The current coronavirus crisis has added a sense of urgency to related effective health and
economic policies (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html;
https://www.weforum.org/covid-action-platform). The scale and scope of the unexpected events
have challenged resources and policymakers. Academics are also trying to respond to this
challenge by providing new insights, although all related data for many analyses will only
emerge over time.
Whereas numerous drivers of the shadow economy have been considered in the literature
(Gërxhani (2004); Goel and Nelson (2016); Schneider and Enste (2000)), the consideration of
spillovers from epidemics is new. The informal sector undermines compliance with government
regulations and lowers tax collections. Our main hypothesis is that epidemics positively impact
the spread of the shadow economy, and we consider both the incidence of epidemics and their
intensity (in terms of afflictions).
Using panel data on nearly 130 nations and nesting the empirical analysis in the broader
literature on the drivers of the shadow sector, we find that both the incidence and the intensity of
epidemics positively and significantly contribute to the spread of the underground sector.
Numerically, a ten percent increase in the intensity of epidemics leads to an increase in the
prevalence of the shadow economy by about 2.1 percent. These main findings withstand
alternative considerations of possible simultaneity, outliers, subsamples of nations, and different
sets of controls. The other results regarding the influence of economic and political freedoms
largely support the literature.
These findings about the spillovers from epidemics have implications for economic policies
in the current times, contributing to the renewed academic interest in the economics epidemics
(Baldwin and di Mauro (2020), Folgi and Veldkamp (2019), Rasul (2020)). In particular, in the

Berdiev et al.

20
present COVID-19 era, while government efforts are primarily directed towards containment and
treatment of the virus, it would behoove policymakers to pay some attention to spillovers on
economic activities, such as the shadow economy. One specific policy implication might be that
island nations and OECD could have similar policies for containment of the informal sector
following epidemics. Such attention to the informal sector is important because a greater shadow
economy limits government resources which would undermine the fight for future diseases, and
the containment of current ones due to lax adherence with health and safety regulations.
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Variable
Shadow

Table 1: Variable definitions, data sources, and summary statistics
Description [observations; mean; standard deviation]

UNEMP

The size of the shadow economy as a percent of GDP measured using the multiple
indicators, multiple causes (MIMIC) method. [3950; 32.28; 12.52]
Dummy variable equal to 1 for the country and year in which there was an epidemic
between 1991-2015, and zero otherwise. Epidemics caused by infectious diseases that
are categorized as viral, bacterial, fungal or prion. [5919; 0.14; 0.35]
The log of one plus the total number affected each year between 1991-2015 (i.e. 100
or more people that are affected, injured or homeless as a result of the epidemic) by
the pandemic divided by population (in millions). [5788; 0.56; 1.77]
Economic growth measured as the log difference of per capital real GDP per capita.
[4917; 1.88; 6.11]
Index of political freedom measured as the sum of civil liberties and political rights.
This index is based on a scale from 2 to 14, with higher numbers denoting more
political freedom. [4962; 6.83; 3.98]
Index bureaucratic quality, measuring the strength and quality of bureaucracy on 0-4
scale, with higher numbers denoting a higher quality. [3391; 2.19; 1.14]
Government size, measured as government final consumption expenditures as a
percent of GDP. [4307; 20.87; 9.10]
Index of economic freedom on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher numbers denoting
more freedom. [3533; 59.22; 11.84]
Index of the rule of law on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher numbers denoting
stronger rule of law. This is a perceptions based index capturing the text to which
people abide by the rules of society, quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
police, courts and the likelihood of crime. [3752; 0.00; 1.00]
Unemployment rate (%). [4810; 8.69; 6.38]

EDUC

Primary school enrollment as a percent of gross enrollment. [4062; 100.28; 17.12]

EpidemINC

EpidemDIFF

ECgrowth
PolFreedom

BureauQual
GovtSize
EconFreedom
RuleLaw

Source
Medina and
Schneider (2017)
Emergency Events
Database#
Emergency Events
Database#
The World Bank
(2018)
Freedom House

The PRS Group
The World Bank
(2018)
Heritage Foundation
(2017)
Kaufmann et al.
(2016)

The World Bank
(2018)
The World Bank
(2018)

Notes: Summary statistics based on all available data from 1991 to 2015. # Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) from the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, www.cred.be).
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EpidemINC
EpidemDIFF
ECgrowth
PolFreedom
BureauQual
GovtSize
EconFreedom
RuleLaw
UNEMP
EDUC

Table 2: Epidemics and the shadow economy: Baseline and extended models
Dependent variable: Shadow
Baseline models
Robustness check R1: Alternate control variables
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.7)
1.320**
1.048*
1.334**
1.100*
(0.545)
(0.581)
(0.545)
(0.611)
0.275***
0.247**
0.278***
(0.104)
(0.115)
(0.104)
-0.142*** -0.131*** -0.137***
-0.125**
-0.142*** -0.131***
-0.116**
(0.049)
(0.049)
(0.053)
(0.054)
(0.049)
(0.050)
(0.053)
0.450***
0.433***
0.085
0.071
0.456***
0.440***
0.434***
(0.080)
(0.081)
(0.103)
(0.105)
(0.081)
(0.082)
(0.092)
-3.504*** -3.641*** -1.967*** -2.126*** -3.495*** -3.630*** -3.814***
(0.278)
(0.283)
(0.330)
(0.336)
(0.278)
(0.284)
(0.305)
-0.202*** -0.208*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.205*** -0.210*** -0.257***
(0.027)
(0.028)
(0.031)
(0.032)
(0.027)
(0.027)
(0.031)
-0.169*** -0.167***
-0.005
-0.006
-0.167*** -0.166*** -0.092***
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.035)
(0.036)
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.030)
-4.756*** -4.668***
(0.561)
(0.571)
0.021
0.021
(0.031)
(0.032)
-0.015
(0.012)

Elasticity
EpidemDIFF

Observations
Number of countries
R-squared

0.207***
(0.078)
2,492
129
0.560

2,430
129
0.563

0.177**
(0.082)
2,057
129
0.580

2,004
129
0.583

0.210***
(0.078)
2,492
129
0.560

2,430
129
0.563

(2.8)

0.252**
(0.116)
-0.103*
(0.054)
0.421***
(0.094)
-3.965***
(0.311)
-0.266***
(0.031)
-0.087***
(0.030)

-0.013
(0.013)
0.177**
(0.082)

2,168
128
0.538

2,113
128
0.542

Notes: See Table 1 for variable details. Regional fixed-effects and a constant are included in each model, but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Asterisks denote the following significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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Robustness checks →

EpidemINC

Table 3: Epidemics and the shadow economy: Robustness checks
Dependent variable: Shadow
R2: Robust Regression
R3: Simultaneity
R4: No Growth
(3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)
1.157**
(0.456)

EpidemDIFF

1.381**
(0.546)
0.297***
(0.090)

EpidemINCt-1

PolFreedom
BureauQual
GovtSize
EconFreedom

Observations
Number of countries
R-squared

0.808***
(0.244)
0.293***
(0.103)

0.102**
(0.046)

0.945*
(0.546)

EpidemDIFFt-1
ECgrowth

R5: Country heterogeneity
(3.7)
(3.8)

-0.092**
(0.041)
0.476***
(0.071)
-2.930***
(0.248)
-0.251***
(0.024)
-0.210***
(0.022)

-0.080*
(0.041)
0.459***
(0.071)
-3.028***
(0.251)
-0.258***
(0.024)
-0.206***
(0.022)

-0.145***
(0.048)
0.449***
(0.080)
-3.512***
(0.278)
-0.204***
(0.027)
-0.170***
(0.026)

2,492
129
0.574

2,430
129
0.579

2,492
129
0.559

0.203**
(0.102)
-0.149***
(0.048)
0.426*** 0.456*** 0.438***
(0.081)
(0.080)
(0.081)
-3.662*** -3.434*** -3.578***
(0.284)
(0.277)
(0.283)
-0.212*** -0.202*** -0.207***
(0.028)
(0.028)
(0.028)
-0.170*** -0.164*** -0.163***
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.026)
2,431
129
0.562

2,492
129
0.558

2,430
129
0.562

-0.111***
(0.024)
0.406**
(0.201)
-1.540***
(0.582)
0.053
(0.062)
-0.229***
(0.066)

-0.109***
(0.024)
0.390*
(0.202)
-1.525***
(0.571)
0.043
(0.063)
-0.232***
(0.066)

2,492
129
0.119

2,430
129
0.115

Notes: See Table 1 for variable details. Models 3.1-3.6 include regional fixed-effects, and Models 3.7-3.8 account for country fixed-effects. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Asterisks denote the following significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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Sample

EpidemINC

Table 4: Epidemics and the shadow economy: Considering different groups of nations
Dependent variable: Shadow
Non-Island
Island
Non-OECD
OECD
(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
1.493**
(0.590)

EpidemDIFF
ECgrowth
PolFreedom
BureauQual
GovtSize
EconFreedom

Observations
Number of countries
R-squared

0.914
(1.189)

-0.126**
(0.053)
0.648***
(0.089)
-3.477***
(0.292)
-0.206***
(0.028)
-0.126***
(0.030)

0.279**
(0.111)
-0.118**
(0.053)
0.629***
(0.090)
-3.632***
(0.297)
-0.211***
(0.029)
-0.124***
(0.030)

2,117
109
0.545

2,066
109
0.548

1.651***
(0.580)

-0.323***
(0.095)
0.374**
(0.158)
0.295
(0.881)
-0.067
(0.097)
-0.632***
(0.058)

0.172
(0.225)
-0.299***
(0.098)
0.377**
(0.162)
0.223
(0.915)
-0.076
(0.099)
-0.629***
(0.060)

375
20
0.758

364
20
0.759

1.157
(0.706)

-0.205***
(0.056)
0.421***
(0.087)
-2.363***
(0.317)
-0.198***
(0.029)
-0.131***
(0.030)

0.291***
(0.105)
-0.190***
(0.057)
0.409***
(0.088)
-2.535***
(0.325)
-0.207***
(0.030)
-0.129***
(0.030)

-0.046
(0.059)
2.243***
(0.524)
-5.797***
(0.475)
0.177***
(0.039)
-0.242***
(0.038)

0.321
(0.204)
-0.054
(0.059)
2.220***
(0.524)
-5.761***
(0.478)
0.170***
(0.039)
-0.243***
(0.038)

1,859
98
0.381

1,798
98
0.383

633
31
0.585

632
31
0.584

Notes: See Table 1 for variable details. Regional fixed-effects and a constant are included in each model, but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Asterisks denote the following significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX
Table 1A: Countries used in the analysis
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia*
Austria*
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The^
Bahrain^
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium*
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam^
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Canada*
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus^
Czech Republic*
Denmark*
Dominican Republic^

Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador
Estonia*
Finland*
France*
Gabon
Gambia, The
Germany*
Ghana
Greece*
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti^
Honduras
Hungary*
Iceland*^
India
Indonesia^
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Ireland*^
Israel*
Italy*
Jamaica^
Japan*^
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.*
Kuwait
Latvia

Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg*
Madagascar^
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta^
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Netherlands*
New Zealand*^
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway*
Oman
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea^
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines^
Poland*
Portugal*
Qatar
Romania

Notes: N = 129. * denotes OECD countries (31) and ^ denotes island countries (20).
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Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore^
Slovak Republic*
Slovenia*
South Africa
Spain*
Sri Lanka^
Suriname
Sweden*
Switzerland*
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago^
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom*^
United States*
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe

